China-Pakistan: China Loosing Interest in Pakistan
STORIES, ANALYSES, EXPERT VIEWS
Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to China, in the view of a Shanghai-based commentator, Chen Yingqiang, is “linked to the fallout from US President Donald Trump’s decision to freeze foreign aid. He highlighted Pakistan’s efforts to salvage the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its preference for China to mediate between Pakistan and the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan."
Yet, despite its seemingly momentous nature, this visit has received scant coverage in China’s mainstream media. This, writes Sana Hashmi (PhD, fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and George HW Bush Foundation for US-China Relations) is suggestive of “waning public interest in Pakistan and, by extension, in China-Pakistan relations. Meanwhile, a spate of terrorist attacks targeting Chinese nationals involved in Chinese-funded projects, particularly along the CPEC, has only deepened Chinese scepticism regarding Pakistan’s reliability as a key partner.”
A few years ago, Lin Minwang, a researcher at Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, argue that China-Pakistan relations were strategically consistent and relatively obstacle-free. He noted that Pakistan had consistently supported China at pivotal historical junctures—transcending traditional alliances in favour of strategic calculus. Today, however, according to Hashmi “that assessment appears increasingly divorced from the prevailing narrative.”
Safety concerns for Chinese nationals: Online discussions in China’s state media reveal mounting concerns over the safety and discrimination faced by Chinese nationals in Pakistan. Numerous videos circulating on Chinese social media show hotels in Pakistan refusing accommodation to Chinese individuals and highlighting racist remarks directed at them. However, the more critical issue remains the safety of Chinese workers engaged in CPEC projects.
Hu Shisheng, director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argues that China has a substantial number of personnel and projects in Pakistan and is genuinely invested in assisting the country’s development. However, the worsening security conditions have compelled the Pakistani government to become more amenable to counter-terrorism cooperation and joint efforts.
The increasing number of terrorist incidents in Pakistan, with Chinese nationals among the targets, "indicates that Pakistan’s fight against terrorism has been ineffective.’
Limited utility of Pakistan
Hashmi concludes that “the China-Pakistan relationship is no longer as seamless as it once was. Pakistan’s strategic utility for China appears increasingly limited. Today, Pakistan functions largely as a cheerleader against Western pressures, a loyal supporter of the One China Policy, and, to a diminishing extent, as a strategically positioned partner due to the Gwadar port. Its utility in countering India has significantly waned, as New Delhi now seems better prepared to deal with a two-front conflict—the very scenario that once underpinned China-Pakistan cooperation.
“Pakistan now appears more dependent on China than vice versa…..” And “with the dismantling of the USAID, China may prove to be a more reliable source of aid for Pakistan.”
Costs of the partnership with Pakistan increasingly outweigh the benefits: Yet for China, writes Hashmi “the relationship is increasingly becoming a liability…..Despite these challenges, Zardari’s visit will be labelled as a success, CPEC is likely to persist, and with it, the rhetoric of China-Pakistan ‘all-weather friendship.’ However, as strategic calculations evolve, China may have to confront a reality where the costs of the partnership increasingly outweigh the benefits.”
