G7: Even as Ukraine Steels Focus, There are Challenges to India’s Foreign Policy
STORIES, ANALYSES, EXPERT VIEWS
The G7 summit was dominated by the Ukraine war, by Russia and China. In fact, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskkyy’s in-person appearance underscored the centrality of the war for the G7 bloc of rich democracies. It also stole much of the limelight from other priorities, including security challenges in Asia and outreach to the developing world, that the leaders focused on at the three-day gathering.
"G7 reaffirmed our commitment to continue our strong backing for Ukraine from every possible dimension," Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said.
Zelenskyy held two major rounds of meetings 21 May, one with G7 leaders and a second with them and a host of invited guests including India and South Korea. He also held one-on-one talks with several of the leaders.
U.S. President Joe Biden announced a new military aid package worth $375 million for Ukraine during his meeting with Zelenskyy, saying the U.S. would provide ammunition and armored vehicles. That fresh pledge came after the U.S. agreed to allow training on American-made F-16 fighter jets, laying the groundwork for their eventual transfer to Ukraine.
While Ukraine dominated the summit, the leaders of Japan, the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada and Italy, as well as the European Union, also aimed to address global worries over climate change, poverty, economic instability and nuclear proliferation.
G7, united against Russia; uncertain on China
The G7 has vowed to intensify the pressure, calling Russia's assault on Ukraine "a threat to the whole world in breach of fundamental norms, rules and principles of the international community."
But the group took a different approach on China. The leaders said they did not want to harm China and were seeking "constructive and stable relations" with Beijing, "recognizing the importance of engaging candidly with and expressing our concerns directly to China."
They also urged China to pressure Russia to end the war in Ukraine and "support a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.”
Gurjit Singh (former Ambassador) notes “the members’ unity is uncertain when it comes to China”. China-related issues such as economic bullying and resilient supply chains were addressed in a generic manner without naming China. 'We recognise that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversifying,’ a G7 statement said. ‘We will take steps, individually and collectively, to invest in our own economic vibrancy. We will reduce excessive dependencies in our critical supply chains.’
China, writes Singh “was not named because the G7 countries have varying concerns. Japan is worried about the East China Sea and Taiwan; Australia and Canada about trade bullying; Germany and France want a way to continue to deal with China. Consensus on Russia does not easily translate into consensus on China.”
Quad, comprising the US, Japan, India and Australia, was more eager in seeking peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, “but again without naming China.”
Growing cohesion in the West: C Raja Mohan (senior fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute and a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express) notes the growing cohesion in the West. While the G7 leaders intensified sanctions against Moscow, they “sought to narrow the differences within the group on how to deal with China…
“The unfolding cohesion within the West is matched by the growing alignment between Russia and China. As the battle lines between the two sides get drawn, we are heading towards a bipolar framework…"
Challenge to India’s discourse on a multipolar world
This should have implications for India’s discourse on a multipolar world, according top Mohan.
Entrenched anti-Western emotion in the Indian elite: “The word is used in at least three different ways in the Indian debate. For one, the talk of a multipolar world for many is about political resentment against the power of the US or more broadly the ‘collective West’. This rhetoric tells us a lot about the entrenched anti-Western emotion in the Indian elite, but it offers little help in understanding the geopolitical dynamic of the world. It is wishful thinking about how the world ought to be rather than how it is.”
A multipolar world is not upon us: Second, “the term multipolar is often used far more analytically to describe the international power structure. But no analysis of global distribution of power today can prove the claim that a multipolar world is upon us……The consolidation of the EU, the reassertion of Russia, the rapid rise of China, the substantive weight of Japan and the slower emergence of India is offered as evidence for the existence of a multipolar world. The conclusion, however, is inaccurate since power is not distributed evenly between major powers….”
The “EU is a powerful entity, but it is a long way from becoming a political, let alone a credible, geopolitical actor. Russia is reasserting itself politically and militarily, but it is a weak economic actor with a GDP barely one-tenth of the EU. Japan is the world’s third largest economy but has little military power and even less political will to consider the use of force…..India and a number of other countries like Brazil, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia are rising in the global power hierarchy, but have serious limitations. None of them can be expected to measure up to the capabilities of the US or China in the near future.”
US no longer a challenge for India: A third usage of ‘multipolar world’, writes Mohan “is with reference to strategies seeking to balance against the dominant power. This has gained ground in the 1990s as a number of powers including India sought to develop political and institutional strategies against the dangers from unconstrained US power.
“India’s decision to join the RIC forum with Russia and China and the BRICS that also brought in Brazil and South Africa were in response to twin threats from the US. One was the Clinton Administration’s policy on rolling back India’s nuclear and missile programmes; the other was US activism on the Kashmir question.”
Change of heart on US
This is no longer the policy of the US or the West. “While the US no longer meddles in the Kashmir question, it is China that mucks around in many ways — seizing territory, backing Pakistan, and raising the issue in international forums.”
As the challenges from China mounted in the second decade of the 21st century, “Delhi made significant adjustments to its worldview. It added a wrinkle to the rhetoric by underlining the importance of promoting a ‘multipolar Asia’ and embraced the Indo-Pacific construct.”
In conclusion, Mohan writes “India’s ‘multipolar world’ of the 1990s was about hedging against US power through the RIC and BRICS; India’s ‘multipolar Asia’ today focuses on balancing China through the Quad and partnerships with the US and its allies. As a bipolar framework envelops Asia, official Delhi will continue to adapt; but the Indian foreign policy discourse lags behind.”
