India - China: Need for New Thinking

India - China: Need for New Thinking

A paper, authored by a group of former diplomats, economists and scientists and published by the Pune International Centre, outlines the way forward for India, China relationship, both in the short-term, where India faces a stark asymmetry in power with respect to China, and in the long-term, which will decide the fate of the relationship.

Among the authors are Gautam Bambawale (former diplomat who served as Indian Ambassador to China, Pakistan and Bhutan) and Ajay Shah (Research Professor of Business, Jindal Global University)

In an interview to The Hindu, Gautam Bambawale says “the starting point for our paper is what I can term as Chinese hostility towards India.”  China “doesn't want a balanced sort of relationship with India, and that it is happy with an unbalanced, conflictual kind of relationship……

 

Building balancing coalitions

“Now, in the short-run, India has a bad hand of cards because of this great asymmetry, which our paper spells out. So in the short-run, the only thing India can do is to build balancing coalitions with groups of countries. We suggest there are three groups of countries with which India can build such balancing coalitions. One is, of course, the major democracies of the world. Second are those countries which are neighbouring to China. So a country like Russia, for example, is a very good country to have such a coalition with. Lastly, of course, countries in India's neighbourhood like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. There is a group of about 20-odd countries with which India can build very strong, deep partnerships. And by deep partnerships, we mean partnerships which go beyond just government-to-government interaction……..We are arguing that India needs to go beyond narrow definitions of strategic autonomy in the short-term.”

 

Imbalance in economic strength

The authors point out that in 2047, if China grows at 5%, it will be an $86 trillion economy in PPP terms. For the next 26 years, if India is able to grow at 6% it will be at $39 trillion; at 8% it will be at $64 trillion.

In this context, Ajay Shah argues India should  “focus on private investment.” At present,  India “is a very, very extensive and intrusive government apparatus operating all over the country, telling firms how to do things. This creates a loss of confidence……”  Gautam Bambawale says “We need to stay competitive internationally, and we need to make our own domestic industry competitive internationally.”

Ajay Shah cautions against  hawkish sentiments in India, “where the thought is now let's go shut down every aspect of engagement with China. We need to pause in that instinct, because some of this can be self-defeating. We need to put India first. Our focus should be, how do we become strong, and we should judge every action by what it does for India's prosperity and strength. We should remember that the other side is an economy that is five times larger, so many times what we might think of as a hostile move that may damage China, in practice it may be a mere pinprick.

“We think that there is a role for careful thinking and finding that middle road that plays optimally for India. How do we build India's strength? How do we create conditions in international relations and diplomacy where India is able to attract more partners and achieve a coalition that is conducive towards India's objectives? That should be our primary objective.”

 

Track-II dialogue suggests lower expectations

Interestingly, at a Track-II dialogue held in early April, possibly the first of its kind to be held after the border crisis, the consensus shared by the two sides was “Lower the expectations”. And that this might be the right tonic to guide the way forward, as both countries seek a new equilibrium after a major rupture in relations following the border crisis.

The Track-II dialogue brought together former ambassadors and military officials from both sides, organised by the Ananta Aspen Centre in New Delhi and the China Reform Forum in Beijing, which is affiliated to the Central Party School.

In this context, the history of India-China relations, writes Ananth Krishnan  (China Correspondent for The Hindu; former Visiting Fellow at Brookings India; previously China Bureau Chief and Associate Editor for the India Today Group) “is rife with examples of how misplaced expectations have burdened the relationship, often only leading to recurring disappointment. In the 1950s, relations veered from being led by idealised notions of restoring some pan-Asian, civilisational partnership — one that, in truth, never really existed through centuries of historical exchanges — to confrontation and ultimately war in 1962.”

The  two “informal summits” in Wuhan in 2018 an in Mallapuram near Chennai the following year, were “seen as marking the start of another new promising era in ties, only to turn out to be another false dawn.”

 

At the core, managing three issues

At the Track-II dialogue, the shared view was that key to arriving at this new, more realistic state of relations will be managing three issues — the boundary question, trade, and the increasing impact of third-party and multilateral engagements on the two-way relationship. On all three fronts, setting the sights on limited goals may end up paying rich dividends.

Boundary dispute: On the boundary dispute, the border skirmish did make it clear that there is “certainly no appetite in China at the moment for a final settlement of the boundary question. That is also the view of most Chinese experts, who suggest it is to be left for the next generation, which means a prolonged period of continued uncertainty on the borders.

“The absence of a permanent peace does not, however, mean both countries are necessarily destined for conflict. What they do need, in the view of military planners of both sides, is small steps to restore a shattered trust….”

On trade: On the trade front, the view in Delhi has shifted remarkably from what was, in the first few years of the government, an all-out courtship of China Inc. If the idea of roping in China as a major economic partner now seems premature in light of the many unresolved political problems, Krishnan says “so is talk of a complete disengagement on trade….. Jettisoning all activity with China is neither realistic nor prudent. Instead, what is needed is a clear-headed, all-of-government approach that decides where both sides can cooperate — infrastructure that has no security implications is an obvious area, as is clean energy given China’s capacities on solar and wind, to name but two — and other areas where Delhi may find it needs to tread with caution, such as the roll-out of 5G….”

External engagements: Finally, both sides need to have a clear conversation on how third parties and external engagement are an increasing factor. The Track-II dialogue made it clear how China is viewing relations with India through the prism of its relations with the United States that are its abiding priority. Beijing has increasingly hit out at what President Xi Jinping called ‘small circles’ when he spoke to Davos, which has now become shorthand for U.S.-involved groupings including the Quad. India has its own grouses with China-involved ‘small circles’ of which there are many, from the numerous small groupings in South Asia that China has convened over the past year, to certain multilateral efforts on Afghanistan that India has been kept out of.


All Neighbours Article