Pakistan’s ‘Victory’ May Not Translate into Concrete Outcomes in Favour
STORIES, ANALYSES, EXPERT VIEWS
C Raja Mohan (director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express) identifies three recent sets of events that highlight Pakistan’s special importance in Afghanistan after the Taliban victory. “One was the appearance of Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, the chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, in Kabul. Another was a (virtual) meeting of top regional diplomats from Afghanistan’s neighbours (Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China) convened by Pakistan’s special representative on Afghanistan, Mohammed Sadiq. Meanwhile, many major regional and international leaders interested in Afghanistan are picking up the phone to call Prime Minister Imran Khan or contact the Army chief, General Qamar Jawed Bajwa. Delhi should expect even more Pakistan-centred political and diplomatic activity on Afghanistan in the days ahead.”
However, this may not translate into concrete outcomes in favour of Pakistan. “Geography has given Pakistan a pivotal role in Afghanistan. Yet, Rawalpindi has been unable to turn it into sustainable political sway over Afghanistan. Neither the creation of Afghan proxies nor the massive assistance from the great powers has helped Pakistan transcend its structural limitations in Afghanistan. The story this time is unlikely to be any different.
“……..Pakistan’s ability to leverage the international interest depends on its ability to control the internal dynamic in Afghanistan. Therein lies the rub. The gap between Pakistan’s reach and its grasp in Afghanistan, however, has been impossible to bridge……
“Pakistan is already running into the familiar problem in Kabul. It is one thing to get the Taliban into Kabul, but it is entirely another to organise a credible new government there. It is now three weeks since the fall of the Ghani government and the factions of the Taliban are struggling to arrive at a new government. There is speculation that Pakistan is helping to sort out the issues and a new government will be announced this week. How cohesive it might be is a different matter……”
In the end, “it is quite tempting to believe today that the spoils of the Afghan war belong to the presumed victor — Pakistan. But it is also possible to argue that the opposite is true — that Pakistan is now part of the Afghan spoils. The strategy of using decades of violent religious extremism to control Afghanistan over the last five decades has also deeply affected Pakistan’s polity that is now under the shadow of the Taliban’s pre-modern ideology.
Pakistan in a classic catch-22 situation: lack of control over the Doha and Haqqani factions
Most observers feel that Pakistan sending its spy chief to Kabul, points to serious concerns of conflict and a possible firefight between Pakistan’s Haqqani Network and the Doha negotiators was the key reason. According to S P Vaid (former DGP J&K) “for Pakistan to have to physically intervene in a leadership crisis indicates its lack of control over the Doha and Haqqani factions. Further, Pakistan has clearly not been able to impress upon the regime the need to cater to Western demands to include ethnic minorities and members of the Ghani regime, and is still to deal with the question of whether to disband ANDSF, purge it of undesirables or just recruit Talibs into the existing structure………”
Pakistan is therefore, “stuck in a classic catch-22 situation, where the West will hold it to its promise of control over the Taliban and of ensuring inclusivity. There is a debate within Pakistan’s security establishment on how to handle this victory and how to keep it under control. Pakistan’s experts are worried that a seemingly-weak Helmandi Pashtun, heading the clergy, could grow wings, while a much-required strong Pashtun as head of government will surely come under Indian, Iranian and Western influence and move in a different direction.
The West still holds the key: “Pakistan is acutely aware that the West holds several cards without which the survival of the regime is impossible. Such levers include American control of Afghanistan’s forex and remittances; existing and future UN and US Treasury sanctions regime; potential CAATSA sanctions for any Russian investment; FATF for financial strangulation; and avenues for Western intelligence to tie down China’s promised BRI investment in a traditionally restive Afghanistan. Even a single misstep by Pakistan could jeopardise its attempts to exit the FATF grey list, while also including Afghanistan in a similar process.”
India’s options: encourage Pashtun separatism
Nevertheless, Mohan believes “Rawalpindi’s ‘victory’ in Afghanistan might make it a bigger nuisance for India and the region but is unlikely to reverse the steady relative decline of Pakistan’s comprehensive national power over the last few decades.”
India might be tempted to the idea of Pashtunistan: However, India may not be perennial soft in its strategies. The greater worry for Pakistan, writes S P Vaid (former DGP J&K “is that it can’t afford a two-front war, with a belligerent India to the east and an India-inspired Afghanistan to the west. Having been granted a strategic wish with a suddenly less-sensitive eastern border, it must be aware that Indian strategists would be counselling their diplomats and intelligence agencies to sell old wine — the idea of Pashtunistan — in a new bottle to the Taliban regime…….The strategic-economic alliance that Pakistan established with China, in order to bind India down to hard borders along its entire west-to-east boundary, may just have been mitigated by the Taliban victory, with India having no option but to encourage Pashtun separatism within Pakistan.”
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa option
Sunil Sharan (author and analyst) looks at India’s options suggests more radical options for India.
“First it must get a guarantee from the Taliban that they will not allow themselves to be used by Pakistan in any jihadi activity in our country. This would be a huge win for India, but it is also to be noted that the Taliban has no interest in Kashmir. In return for this guarantee, India must recognize the Taliban and establish full diplomatic relations with them.
“Successive Indian governments have invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan when it was clear that the Americans were losing the war all the while. The Taliban are crying out for foreign investment. India must continue its development of Afghanistan. If India doesn’t do so, countries like China and surprise, surprise, the US are just waiting to fill in the void.”
Stating that Pakistan will not become a responsible nation unless it is broken up, Saran suggests India to focus on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pathan-populated province of Pakistan that Afghanistan claims. “It has a population of about 35 million people, which is roughly the population of Afghanistan. Pathans constitute about 40 per cent of Afghanistan. More importantly, the new rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban, are overwhelmingly Pathan…….Afghanistan dearly wants to merge Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with itself. Needless to say the Pakistanis are not happy with this ambition. They want the Durand Line to be recognized as the international border with Afghanistan as soon as possible.” Afghanistan does not recognise the Durand Line.
“Just as Pakistan interferes in Kashmir, so too if India can regain the trust of the Taliban, it can become a potent force for Afghanistan’s claim over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Nothing will rile Pakistan more. In contrast to the Baloch insurgency, which does not appear to have significant support in Iran, any outpouring of emotion in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will serve as a rallying cry for Afghanistan to take charge.”
